Policy Choices in Internal Conflicts: Governing Systems and Outcomes by V. R. Raghavan

Author:V. R. Raghavan [Raghavan, V. R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Geopolitics, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9789384464103
Google: EgOqCQAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 28405794
Publisher: VIJ BOOKS INDIA
Published: 2013-05-01T00:00:00+00:00

In Myanmar, the external interest is focused more on the pro-democracy movement than on the ethnic conflicts. Here, both the regime and NLD sought external support to promote their goals. Whereas the military junta countered the Western intervention not just by its total defiance and rejection but also cultivating countries such as China, with whom Myanmar has forged strong strategic relations, the pro-democratic forces found in the international community the support for restoring democracy. In fact, the issue has occupied the agenda of the international community, which sought to isolate and penalize the military junta for its authoritarian policies. The US and the European Union pursued a policy of non-engagement and also imposed economic sanctions on the country. The United Nations is another external actor, which has exerted pressure on the regime to democratize Myanmar and establish peace through negotiations with all the ethnic groups. Cumulatively, the external pressure has played at least a partial role in bringing about the recent political change.

Divide and Engage

Dividing and then engaging a group is a much preferred strategy of every government involved in internal conflicts. However, no government admits that it seeks to divide a group. Certainly, since the top group leadership opposes such a strategy, governments tend to interpret the strategy as an opportunity for peace willingly extended by them. More than other governments dealt with in this chapter, both India and Sri Lanka have shown strong interest in the divide-and-engage strategy and earned dividends over the years. Breaking the unity of the Nagas was pursued as a major war-ending strategy of the government. In the 1950s, the focus was on strengthening the hands of the moderates to emerge as an alternate force to the militants. The government had encouraged the Naga People’s Convention (NPC) to mobilize tribal opinion against the secessionist demand of the NNC and exert pressure on its leadership to accept a political settlement to the war. In its several resolutions during 1957–59, while urging the Indian government to satisfy the Naga people’s territorial aspirations, the NPC leaders asked the NNC to join hands with them in negotiating a political settlement. In 1958, the NPC appointed a liaison committee to contact the militant leadership with a view to involving them in drafting a charter of demands. But when the Naga Federal Government insisted upon its recognition by the Indian government and sought to negotiate only around the issue of independence to Nagaland, the NPC went ahead alone to formulate its proposals. There always existed a line of communication between the NPC and the Indian leadership. Prime Minister Nehru met its leaders on several occasions, and in order to increase their credibility in Naga society, accepted their statehood demand in 1960. While these political gestures to the NPC drove a wedge between the moderates and militants, they did not isolate the NNC from the mainstream Naga society. But the very fact that a section of Naga opinion was ready to accept a solution within the Indian Union showed the emerging challenges to the NNC’s claim as the sole representative organization of the Nagas.

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